"British Strategy in the First Anglo-Afghan Wars," Topic

… 1838–1842

"Throughout the nineteenth century, Great Britain, the world's preeminent naval empire, and Russia, one of the preeminent land empires, vied for control throughout Central Asia in the "Great Game." Twice in forty years, Britain invaded Afghanistan to expand its security bubble in South Asia and prevent Russia from threatening the "crown jewel" of the British Empire—India. However, the British failure to align ways and means with a sensible political end was a critical component of this "Great Game" between the two imperial powers and led to unnecessary bloodshed. The initial invasion in 1838 was prompted by faulty assumptions about the geostrategic situation and the Anglo-Indians' ability to pacify a politically fractured country by appointing an unpopular former leader as its head. British strategy for occupation focused on creating a strong central government in a country where power was, traditionally, local. Britain had the means to invade the country yet failed to apply its material strength to realistic political ends. Ultimately, though the British suffered a humiliating military defeat in Afghanistan, they maintained an amicable relationship with Afghan leaders following their withdrawal. While the initial strategic ends were not met, shifting assumptions based on a better understanding of the situation allowed Britain to achieve a broader strategic goal of a friendly Afghanistan to provide defense in depth against Russian and Persian influence in its most-prized colony…"

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